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Abstract
The concept of the ‘social investment state’ refocuses attention on the productive function
of social policy eclipsed for some time by the emphasis on its social protection or compensation
roles. Here we distinguish between different social investment strategies, the Nordic ‘heavy’
and the Liberal ‘light’, with particular reference to the inclusive growth approach adopted in
Australia. In 2007, social democrats in Australia returned to government with a clear mandate
to reject the labour market deregulation and other neoliberal policies of its predecessor, and
to tackle entrenched social and economic disadvantage in Australian society. For the last
five years, social investment and inclusive growth has been at the centre of the Australian
social policy agenda. Against this background, the article examines and critically assesses the
(re)turn to ‘social investment’ thinking in Australia during Labor’s term in office (2007–13).
Analysis focuses not just on what was actually achieved, but also on the constraining role of
prevailing economic and political circumstances and on the processes that were used to drive
social investment reform. Inmanyways, the article goes someway to exposing ongoing tensions
surrounding the distinctiveness of ‘social investment’ strategies pursued by leftist parties within
the (neo)liberal state.
Introduction
In this article, we critically examine the concept of ‘social investment’ and the
political strategies pursued by social democratic parties in power. Here we
distinguish between investment platforms, the Nordic ‘heavy’ and the Liberal
‘light’, with particular reference to the inclusive growth strategy adopted by the
Australian Labor Party during its term in office (2007–13). We critically examine
the reasons for Labor adopting a ‘social investment’ approach. In so doing,
the article provides a critical analysis of the content and coherence of Labor’s
social investment strategy in terms of policy change (cf. Hall, 1993). Analysis
focuses not just on what was actually achieved, but also on the constraining role
of prevailing economic and political circumstances and on the processes that
were used to drive social investment reform. More broadly, we are interested in
situating the Australian case within the growing literature on ‘social investment’,
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and we contrast the Australian ‘light’ approach with the ‘heavy’ investment
strategies pursued elsewhere in Northern Europe. In many ways, the article goes
some way to exposing ongoing tensions surrounding the distinctiveness of ‘social
investment’ strategies pursued by leftist parties within the (neo)liberal state.
The concept of a ‘social investment state’ has a deep resonance with an
Australian social policy history strongly characterised by productivist values and
giving each other a ‘Fair Go’ (opportunity). We illustrate this briefly from the
classic moments in the evolution of the ‘Australian Way’ before reflecting on the
(re)turn to ‘social investment’ policies in the early part of the twenty-first century.
We show how this productivist revival helped break the austerity constraints on
Australian social policy created in the neoliberal period. At the same time, we
find that the contemporary concept of ‘the social investment state’ is only a
partial expression of this productivist tradition and remains politically fragile
because of deep uncertainties around the future of domestic economic policy.
We also find that, because of its rather unique history and policy pathway of
achieving redistributive efforts using the instruments of wage regulation (rather
than public expenditure in traditional areas of welfare), Australia has a particular
challenge of reviving the productive dimension of social policy in a way that
is not detrimental to its protective or compensatory functions. Needless-to-say,
some of the longer-term outcomes and returns on investments in areas such as
early childhood development, mental health, education and social mobility, for
example, cannot be accommodated in this review.
Social investment: emerging concept and policy context
‘Social investment’ arguably represents the very latest justification for social policy
to guide the development of the economy and society in the twenty-first century.
The early origins of the social investment perspective are traceable to the founding
of the Swedish social-democratic welfare state in the 1930s, and the arguments of
Swedish social democrats who viewed social policy as an investment rather than
a cost (Tilton, 1993). Since the late 1990s, new ideas and strategies concerning
the role of social policy for societal development have been formulated, and,
internationally, policy agendas now point towards a similar policy logic based
around notions of ‘social investment’ (Midgley, 1999). The notion of ‘social
investment’ makes reference to policies that aim to help disadvantaged citizens
to succeed in education and the labour market. As Jenson (2012) argues, ‘social
investment’ can be distinguished both from the more traditional ‘Keynesian’
social policy approach based on income and job protection and from the
‘neoliberal’ onebasedonderegulationand the commodificationofhuman labour.
Nevertheless, social policy scholars do not share a singular theoretical core on a
par with macro demand-side management or supply-side economic liberalism,
nor could we say that the ‘social investment’ perspective has fully emerged as the
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dominant policy paradigm (see, for example, Hemerijck, 2012). Despite some
of the conceptual vagueness, two core features may be observed: investment in
human capital and the objective of full labour market participation. Indeed, the
notion that the social investment state seeks to rebuild the welfare state around
work has become iconic in the European context but, as we shall see, this has
been a long-standing tradition in the Australian context. Conceptually, scholars
attempt to separate out ‘social investment’ spending from social spending on ‘old
social risks’ relating to pensions, healthcare and unemployment benefits (but
this can be problematic as we shall see). More broadly, scholarship continues to
observe distinctions between different ‘worlds’ (Morel et al., 2012) and ‘varieties’
of social investment regime (Bonoli, 2009), with further distinctions between
different investment strategies. These may be described as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ for
example (Bonoli, 2012), or (as we prefer) ‘heavy’ and ‘light’, and our notion of
‘Social Policy as Productive Factor’ may go beyond that originally envisaged in
Europe in the late 1990s (European Commission, 2000).
The experience of the Nordic countries suggests that it may be perfectly
possible to combine strong social protection (i.e., ‘old’ social spending) with
heavy investment in human capital (i.e., ‘new’ social spending, particularly
in education and early childhood policies) in order to secure greater levels
of equality and foster the human capital of future generations (Kvist 2014).
According to Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) social policy should actively mobilise
the productive potential of citizens in order to mitigate the ‘new’ social risks
of the post-industrial knowledge-based economy (adversely affecting low-skilled
workers, women, young adults and children). New family- and child-centred
investment strategies, for example, can break patterns of social inheritance
and exclusion. Social protection, however, is of paramount importance even
in the most productivist of welfare states, as Esping-Andersen (2001) argues.
The human capital-based investment strategy will inevitably leave some citizens
behind, and, thus, it remains an imperative to have a secure welfare safety
net of minimum income support underpinning the social investment strategy.
Social democrats in market liberal economies such as Labour (between 1997 and
2010) in the UK, by contrast, have pursued lighter social and human capital-
based investment strategies alongside the pro-market employment orientation
of welfare provision. Here ‘passive’ welfare systems, which had created a ‘moral
hazard’, were transformed by ‘active’ social policies.1 The role of the state was
to facilitate ‘activation’, with new training programmes to improve skills, and
new forms of welfare ‘conditionality’ to tackle the wider cultural problem
of ‘worklessness’ in society. Tax and benefit reforms, and incentives, helped
to ‘make work pay’. This policy platform was inspired by ‘Third Way’ social
democratic thinking advocated by Anthony Giddens (1998), and later embraced
by the European Commission and the OECD (Hemerijck, 2012; Jenson, 2010).
In Figure 1, we see the different investment strategies which show the Nordic
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Figure 1. Four worlds of social investment
Source: Adapted from Morel et al. (2012: 358).
dual investment approach (i.e., protection and promotion), and the UK’s human
capital investment approach combined with low social protection. The USA is
taken as an example of a weakly developed social investment state.
The policy context in Australia, however, is very different to that found
in Europe. Here we find the emergence and foundations of Australia’s ‘social
investment state’ at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth century (this has been well documented elsewhere, Perkins et al., 2005;
Smyth, 2008). Its novelty lay in the emphasis on the role of social policy as
economic investment. Thus, social investment played a key role in the economy,
with extensive government investment in capital infrastructure, utilities and
state enterprises. Industrial regulation provided a formative social investment
pathway and the orientation towards a ‘welfare society’, rather than a ‘welfare
state’. Minimum wage laws were introduced in South Australia in 1894 and then,
in 1907, the ‘Harvester Judgment’ gave courts in Australia the power to determine
acceptable working conditions including (minimum) living wages for families.
Thus, a social economy with a fair wage was the order of the day. Clearly, an
inclusive growth strategy has always been at the heart of the ‘Australian Way’.
Even the so-called ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ only made sense – and in fact only
ever worked – when integrated within a successful growth strategy designed to
deliver more and better-paid manufacturing jobs in the industrial period.
Across the 1980s and 1990s, social policy had progressively reduced its role to
social protectionor compensation, vacating the sphereof economicproduction to
the newly revived freemarket economics.Welfare slowly shrank to the dimension
of an income ‘safety net’, and thus seemingly faced a future of permanent
austerity. However, with the election of the Rudd Labor government in 2007,
we observe a return to the characteristically Australian productivist tradition
of active state investment. The ‘social investment’ agenda emerged first as an
economic policy agenda aimed at lifting the performance of the nation’s ‘human
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capital’ (especially disadvantaged groups whoweremeasurably underachieving).
This was overlaid by a ‘social inclusion’ agenda belatedly adopted from Europe.
As we shall show below, social policies were soon being politically reframed in the
languages of ‘investment’ and ‘inclusion’, although the narratives lacked depth
and the policies any rigorous framework of the means for and goals of social
investment (Saunders, 2013).
In his critique of ‘social investment’, Nolan (2013) distinguishes the
‘paradigm’ from the ‘platform’. We shall show that social investment is already
embedded as a platform in Australia. But we also explore what the Australian
experience can tell us about it as a paradigm. Here we have three main points of
departure. The first arises from the observation that the agenda requires a more
integrated approach to economic and social policy than that which was obtained
for much of the postwar period (Smyth and Buchanan, 2013). Especially after
the triumph of neoliberal economics in the 1980s and 1990s, social policy found
itself subordinated to the market with little room to construct a positive role for
state intervention. Thus, when economic policy actually shifted to allow space
for a social investment agenda which would tackle the negative effects of poverty
and inequality, even while promoting economic growth, many in social policy
remained suspicious of an ongoing subordination of the social to the economic
(Nolan, 2013).
But the challenge to a better integration of economic and social policy
runs more deeply through the discipline. Thus, Beblavy´ et al. (2013) describe
the difficulties in integrating a study of education with social protection in
the OECD, when the first is positioned as being about ‘opportunities’ and the
second about ‘outcomes’. Education of course is the vanguard of the social
investment approach. The narrow preoccupation of the social policy tradition
with the tax and transfer system has also stifled dialogue with development
policy where the inclusive growth approach offers a more complete integration
of the economic and the social than that so far afforded by the social investment
framework. Midgley (1999), for example, writes of social policy’s inability to
take full account of the role of social policy in growth and structural change. To
progress ‘social investment’, the new role of social policy cannot just be about
protection but about building the productive capacities of citizens – principally,
but not exclusively, their education and health.
This leads to our second challenge. While the positive social policy
environment in Australia has partly reflected an economy that has avoided
recession for over two decades, today’s global economic environment highlights
that a social investment platform by itself is not enough if the economy does
not deliver sufficient employment opportunities. Here social policy cannot
be indifferent to the different implications for its role of either a persistent
neoliberal ‘growth first’ strategy or a shift to the alternative of ‘inclusive growth’
currently being developed by the OECD and Bretton Woods institutions. In the
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inclusive growth strategy, government seeks to influence the pattern of economic
development to ensure opportunities for all citizens (OECD, 2014). The third
challenge – and one very much a focus of this paper – is already well canvassed in
the literature: that is the tendency for the productivist values of social investment
to be promoted at the expense of, rather than as a complement to, the value
of social protection. Here the Australian case is of particular interest because
we show how the recent renewal of the characteristically productivist welfare
tradition has indeed been accompanied by greater constraints around aspects of
its income support system.
Australia is an interesting site onwhich to explore these issues. The neoliberal
period brought radical not incremental change to the traditional Australian
welfare state model. In the mid-1990s, the Australian welfare regime was well
recognised in the international literature as a fourth – ‘radically redistributive’ –
world, an exception to Esping-Andersen’s threefold typology. Australia became
routinely identified as the ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ (see Deeming, 2013a, for
a critical review of this literature). By the close of the twentieth century, this
model had been largely confined to history and the new social investment state
was being designed around the needs of ‘hardworking’ Australian families.
Australia’s (re)turn to social investment
If the oil crises of the 1970s helped to usher in the neoliberal chapter in Australian
politics, then the global financial crisis helped to instigate a return to social
investment (Saunders and Deeming, 2011). The Rudd Labor government, which
had been elected in 2007, reverted to ‘Keynesian’ social investment policies in
order to stimulate the economy in the face of recession (showing the interchange
of economic ideas, see Hall, 1989, on different variants of Keynesianism). ‘Nation
Building’, rather than neoliberal austerity measures, point to the productive
interpretation and value of social interventions as ‘social policy’ under Labor.
Capital spending on national infrastructure projects and new investment in
road, rail and port infrastructure, for example, may be outside the more narrow
confines of the list of policy proposals contained in the Social Investment Package
produced by the European Commission (2013), but we might well question
the logic of this framework. Such questioning of the term and of what might
reasonably be included or excluded under a ‘social investment strategy’ is a
recurring theme in this article.
Labor politicians now distanced themselves from neoliberal ideology,
arguing instead for social democratic values and principles of social investment
and inclusion to help make Australia a fairer society. As we shall see, however,
there were strong continuities but also critical differences from the ‘neoliberal’
agenda, particularly with the role of the ‘enabling’ or ‘active’ investment state
taking greater responsibility for workforce participation and for skills, training
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and employment strategies, as articulated by social democrats in Europe (Esping-
Andersen et al., 2002). Keynesian principles of social investment in human capital
and infrastructure were also revived under Labor. The traditional social demo-
cratic concern with social justice also remained, but the relationship between
the state and recipients of welfare was now recast in a new contract of ‘rights
and responsibilities’, framed by new thinking about inclusive economic growth
(Smyth andBuchanan, 2013). TheLabor governmentnowfirmlybelieved in social
inclusion through paid work. Policymakers agreed that all working-aged adults
whocouldwork shouldbe engaged in the labour force, thus increasing the central-
ity of paid work to the securing and production of family well-being in Australia.
In the lead-up to the 2007 election, Labor had announced its support for
a ‘social inclusion’ policy. The approach rested on the assumption that a purely
income-based approach to disadvantage does little to address the underlying
causes of social disadvantage. Social inclusion initiatives focused on social and
economic participation as a means of overcoming social disadvantage. The social
inclusion agenda had two guiding principles: firstly, it must tackle the social
exclusion of individuals and communities; and, secondly, it must invest in the
human capital of citizens, especially the most disadvantaged. The goal for Labor
was to reduce state spending on unproductive areas of social welfare, such as
social security benefits, by increasing labour market participation and inclusion.
Access to paid work was not only seen as the best welfare guarantee, but higher
rates of labour market participation also increases the tax base and thus helps to
sustain other welfare state functions, such as healthcare and pensions for older
citizens in retirement.
The Labor government regarded work as the best route out of poverty for
unemployedAustralians, although it was now content to pursue the (diminished)
goal of full employability, as opposed to full employment. Australia has one of
the lowest unemployment rates among the advanced economies (Figure 2), and
the number of people out of work has risen following the economic downturn in
2008.
Nevertheless, the legitimate role of the active welfare state was to mobilise
the full productive potential of Australian citizens. New ‘activation’ and job
training programmes helped to reskill workers and increase their job readiness.
Long-term unemployment can deskill in the knowledge economy. Training
unemployed citizens in the skills required by employers was therefore part
of the supply-side approach adopted by the Labor government to overcome
shortfalls in the economy. Compared to European countries, however, the
level of state investment in human capital policies and active labour market
programmes (ALMPs) in Australia remained relatively low by comparison,
and their effectiveness to generate successful employment outcomes in the
Australian context is questionable (Belchamber, 2013). Table 1 shows total annual
expenditureonactive labourmarket policies inAustralia at0.3per cent ofGDP for
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TABLE 1. Public expenditure on active labour market policies in
the advanced economies (% of GDP)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Denmark 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.3
Sweden 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
Finland 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0
France 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9
Germany 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8
Norway 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 − − − −
UK 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 − −
Australia 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
New Zealand 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
United States 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Markets Statistics (DOI: 10.1787/lfs-
data-en).
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Figure 2. Unemployment rates (all adults) in the advanced economies, 2000–13
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Markets Statistics (DOI: 10.1787/lfs-data-en).
the years 2007–11. Denmark had the highest expenditure onALMPs at 2.3 per cent
of GDP in 2011. The relatively low level of investment in ALMPs may surprise,
given Labor’s firm commitment to social investment and inclusion. However,
if social investment in ‘human capital policies’ is more broadly conceived
to include education (including vocational education and training in schools
and universities), we find Australia has above average spending and performs
well on educational and training outcomes (Burke, 2013). There is widespread
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Figure 3. The strength of the link between individual and parental earnings in the advanced
economies Note: The height of each bar measures the extent to which sons’ earnings levels
reflect those of their fathers. The higher the value, the greater is the persistence of earnings
across generations, thus the lower is the intergenerational earnings mobility.
Source: OECD (2010: 181–98).
consensus that advancedwelfare states have tomaintain ahighly skilled andhighly
productive workforce in order to maintain living standards and competitive
advantage in the global economy.
The Labor government embraced the latest social investment principles that
prioritise high levels of employment for both men and women. New family-
and child-centred social policies were introduced that effectively ‘hollowed
out’ the old ‘male bread-winner/female home-maker’ (or ‘wage earner’) model
of welfare in favour of the new dual-earner model of family-centred welfare
production (Deeming, 2013a). In terms of policy redirection, this welfare effort
looked to privilege the active stages of the life course, but here Labor was also
attempting to promote social mobility. For Labor’s policy of social inclusion also
committed the government to tackling social exclusion at birth. Comparatively,
Australia performs well on most indicators of intergenerational social mobility,
which is concerned with the relationship between the socio-economic status of
parents and the status their children will attain as adults. Figure 3, for example,
shows the strength of the link between the individual and parental earnings. In
Australia, this link is relatively low compared to the UK, where it is relatively
high.
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Labor focused much of its efforts on strengthening the system of welfare
for ‘hardworking families’; this term, which has positive connotations, was
extensively used by Rudd and Gillard during the 2007 federal election. Successive
Labor budgets (2008–12) were mildly progressive, intent on improving the living
standards for this group. The government provided tax relief for low-income
households, the Low Income Tax Offset, and child-care tax rebates to the tune
of $47 billion, such as the Child Care Rebate and Family Tax Benefit, to help
provide for their needs. The Labor administration also introduced the national
Paid Parental Leave scheme in 2011. Thus, a new model of employment relations
is in the making whereby both men and women share both working and family
time.
The very notion of ‘hardworking Australian families’, the preferred
expression of Prime Minister Gillard in her 2010 Address to the Nation, is not
just a rhetorical device aimed at a political constituency – it also articulates
a range of normative assumptions about the way in which life should be
lived in Australia in the twenty-first century. Work is seen as the best form
of welfare for Australian families, not only because work provides greater
financial rewards, but also because it promotes individual and social well-being.
Therefore, regulatory work-based welfare measures that had been introduced in
the 1990s were strengthened in order to help move welfare claimants into paid
employment. Thus, increased benefit conditionality was perfectly justifiable in
order to tackle what policymakers saw as the growing social problem of ‘welfare
dependency’ in Australia and the culture of ‘worklessness’ that had evolved out
of the passive system of social security transfers.With the emphasis on individual
responsibility, reciprocity and obligation, there are strong continuities here with
neoliberal workfare-orientated policies, as benefit claimants, particularly parents
with young children, now found new conditions and forms of enforcement
attached to social security payments: being available for work and actively seeking
employment and being able to demonstrate this, for example, were minimum
codes of conduct.Harsh punitive sanctions help to guard against non-compliance
(Blaxland, 2013).
Labor’s Fair Work Act reversed the unpopular labour market polices of the
1990s and improved job security for workers. In particular, Labor restored to
Australian workers the legal right to appeal against harsh or unfair dismissals
from their place of work – a right that had been rescinded by the Workplace
Relations Amendment Act 2005, known as WorkChoices. Once again, collective
bargaining was encouraged andwages were to reflect relative living standards and
the needs of workers (as well as the potential impact of changes on the labour
market and unemployment levels). Low-paid workers clearly benefited. Despite
the falling value of minimum wages during the 1980s and 1990s, minimum
wage protection levels in Australia increased during the 2000s, offering low-paid
workers better protection from the vagaries of the market.
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Targeted tax cuts for working families and the Fair Work initiative, which
reinstated the notion of appropriate minimum wage rates on social justice
grounds, clearly marked a return to more familiar territory for Australian social
policy. However, the Australian ‘social investment’ discourse was clearly not just
about protecting low-income working families from the perils of the free market.
Labor had embraced the latest social investment principles with the new family-
and child-centred policies, child-care rebates and tax breaks that now saw more
affluent ‘middle-class’ families drawn into the ‘fiscal’ welfare system, thus creating
a ‘dual’ welfare system in Australia.
Significantly, this ‘social investment state’ reform agenda in Australia
emerged from economic not social policy – perhaps explaining why social policy
researchhas been so slow to recognise themajorwelfare reform trend it embodies.
Also it originated under the Liberal–National coalition government led by John
Howard (1996–2007), underscoring its bipartisan appeal. The catalyst was the call
for a ‘thirdwave of national reform’ by theVictorian state government (Australian
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2005). It described the success of the
first two waves in reinvigorating a national economy after significant decline in
the 1980s. Thus, the first wave opened up the economy in that decade principally
through tariff reductions and financial deregulation, while the second focused
on microeconomic reform and was driven through the National Competition
Policy framework established in 1995. While emphasising the ongoing value of
these reforms, the report insisted that participation and productivity had now
emerged as the critical drivers of future prosperity. ‘The most effective way’, it
said, to boost productivity and participation is to develop our human capital.
Improving health, learning and work outcomes is how we build a healthy, skilled
and motivated society, and a high income economy that is among the world’s
best’ (Australian Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2005: 8).
The Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) Reform Council was
established in 2006 and a national reform agenda commenced in 2008. Chairman
John Brumby (2013) summarised the work after five years in a way which shows
the coalescence of economic and social goals. ‘There were twomain elements’, he
said, ‘further regulation reform, and investment in human capital . . . (it) was all
about improving the lives of Australians – their health and well-being, their skill
levels and education, their participation in work and in society more broadly . . .
It would be good for individuals, good for families, but also good for an economy
whose greatest future strength would lie in the resilience, creativity and capacities
of its people’. The key social policy areas related to the early years, schooling, the
employment participation of youth and at-risk groups; better health services and
systems; and closing the gap on indigenous disadvantage. It is a policy profile
which matches broadly that associated with the Social Investment Package in
Europe – relating to the early years, youth, activation and health (European
Commission, 2013).
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While often referred to as the ‘human capital’ agenda, the breadth of the
COAG reforms points to the influence on Australian policymakers of Sen’s work
on capabilities (Sen, 2005), and the capabilities approach has also underpinned
the Federal Treasury’s economic well-being framework. This approach, said
COAG’s ‘Third Wave’ report, ‘considers not only incomes, but also health and
education outcomes . . . A human capital approach therefore supports not
only economic outcomes, but also the public interest more broadly’ (Australian
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2005). The COAG Reform Council’s
five-year progress review found that the implementation and outcomes had been
a mixed success. While endorsing the overall policy agenda, it noted that there
was some loss of reform momentum as a result of the global financial crises,
the changing political composition of member governments and the general
challenges created to national reform agendas by Australia’s federal system of
government. Further, many significant areas of reform relating to human capital
have subsequently occurred outside of the COAG framework. Whether or not
COAG continues as the vehicle of national reform inAustralia remains to be seen.
However the policy directions which it has set have provided Australia with the
base for that transition from a welfare to a social investment state integral to the
inclusive growth approach (Smyth and Buchanan, 2013).
The Labor administration also secured major investment in ‘old’ social
welfare protection against social risks during its term in office, securing real
improvements to the standardof living forpensioners andpeoplewith adisability,
although the extent to which all forms of ‘social spending’ may be differentiated
between ‘social investment’ spending (looking for ‘returns’) and ‘non-social
investment’ spending is conceptually problematic, and currently contested as
previously discussed (Nolan, 2013). Superannuation policy, for instance, in
Australia is arguably social investment in financial capital accumulation (i.e.,
part of the ‘piggy-bank’ function of the welfare state alongside the ‘Robin
Hood’ protective welfare function that redistributes resources within society).
The minimum-income protection floor for pensioners was raised to 28 per
cent of average weekly male earnings, following the Harmer Review (2009)
of the pensions system, and the Superannuation Guarantee rate was set to
increase from 9 per cent in 2012 to 12 per cent by 2018, following the Cooper
Review (2010), benefiting 8.4 million Australians. The Australian health service
was also strengthened under Labor, another key social democratic reform, and
Labor introducedDisabilityCare Australia to support people with significant and
permanent disability. In many ways, the Labor government was an ambitious
welfare-state builder but, in other respects, the Australian system of welfare was
arguably attempting to catch up with social welfare systems found inmany of the
other developed economies. Importantly, Figure 4 does show a notable rise in
the level of public expenditure as Labor strengthened health, education, pensions
and disability services.
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Figure 4. Total public social expenditure in the advanced economies, 2000–13 (as a percentage
of gross domestic product)
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (SOCX data, DOI: 10.1787/socx-data-en).
Social investment and equality
In this section, we move to consider in more detail the social security
policy framework in Australia and some of the distributional impacts and
consequences of Labor’s social investment and inclusion strategy. We are
particularly interested in social protectionandout-of-workbenefits; and the long-
running trends in poverty and inequality, thus placing Australian trends within
a comparative context. We also consider gender inequalities and Indigenous
peoples’ disadvantage. Proponents of social investment maintain that a secure
welfare safety net of minimum income support is an imperative but, with the
focus on productive investment and activation in the Australian context, it is
far from self-evident that adequate social protection has been secured during
the latest round of social democratic reforms. Most importantly, unemployment
risks themselves are not evenly distributed across society, and risk is increasingly
concentrated at the bottom of the socio-economic class structure. Low-skilled
workers, for example, face a different and altogether higher risk of unemployment
than skilled workers and middle-class professionals.
There is good evidence now emerging that suggests investment in human
capitalmay have been accompanied by greater constraints imposed onAustralia’s
system of income support. So, while minimum wage schemes and working tax
credits helped to ensure that work paid, wage replacement rates fell in real terms
by comparison with average earnings. In 2005, for example, unemployment
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Figure 5. Unemployment benefit replacement rates for adults in the advanced economies (%
of average wage levels in 2011, plus 2007 for Australia)
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Markets Statistics (DOI: 10.1787/lfs-data-en).
benefit replacement rates for an adult stood at 33 per cent of average wages
compared to just 23 per cent in 2011 – a 10 per cent fall against average earnings.
Benefit levels in Australia continue to be amongst the lowest in the Western
world. Thus, Australians appear to accept the risk of a relatively low standard of
living and poverty if they are unable to work or become unemployed. Benefit
replacement rates, paid in the initial phase of unemployment, are low compared
to other advanced economies. For an unemployed adult, benefit replacement
rates amount to about one-fifth of average wages; only unemployed adults in the
UK receive less (Figure 5). Wage replacement rates for single parents and couples
with children in Australia are better, but they remain relatively low in comparison
to the other OECD nations (Figures 6 and 7).
Inmanyways, Labor’s approach to social investment and inclusion remained
distinctly neoliberal or ‘light’, characteristic of the ‘Work First’ approach (any
job is better than inactivity). Labor continued to develop the workfare-orientated
strategy that relies on setting very strong work incentives, largely at the expense
of income support allowances – already low by international standards. Benefit
conditionality increased under Labor and spending on ALMPs, again relatively
low by international standards, remained unchanged over the 2007–13 period.
Investment in the social security system for unemployed workers and
vulnerable citizens living on out-of-work benefits was not accorded a priority.
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Figure 6. Unemployment benefit replacement rates for a single parent with two children in the
advanced economies (% of average wage levels in 2011, plus 2007 for Australia)
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Markets Statistics (DOI: 10.1787/lfs-data-en).
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Figure 7. Unemployment benefit replacement rates for a couple with two children in the
advanced economies (% of average wage levels in 2011, plus 2007 for Australia)
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Markets Statistics (DOI: 10.1787/lfs-data-en).
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Figure 8. Income inequality in the advanced economies, mid-1980s to the late 2000s (Gini
coefficients) Note: Arrows indicate the change and direction of income inequality.
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database (IDD in OECD.Stat).
Liberal welfare states have long assumed that individuals prefer not to work
if minimum wages are undermined by decent social security benefits (i.e.,
‘moral hazard’); in the Australasian context this has particular resonance as work
incentives have long taken priority over any meaningful standard of adequacy
in social policy (Deeming, 2013a). During Labor’s term in office, social policy
scholars (e.g., Soldatic andPini, 2012) continued to call intoquestion the adequacy
of social security benefits for those not in paid work. Labor, however, was
essentially content to preserve Australia’s system of redistribution and arguably
accepted the political limits and constraints imposed by the low-tax approach
to social democracy (Deeming, 2013b; Wilson, 2013). In Australia, the burden
of tax on waged labour is low by international standards, only Switzerland and
New Zealand appear to have lower tax rates than Australia. Indeed, a major
independent review of taxation policy in 2009 (Henry Review, 2009) argued that
the country’s tax and transfer system, which has long favoured market freedom
and individual opportunity, had served Australia well, and the Labor government
accepted this verdict.
These reforms go to the heart of the question of whether growth in the
Australian economy has been inclusive. A strong economy and low levels of
unemployment have lifted many but not all boats; a small minority of the
Australian population has remained jobless. Most of the gains from economic
growthwere highly concentrated at the top end of the income distribution, and as
a result we find relative poverty and inequality has risen in recent times. Figure 8,
for example, shows widening inequality since the mid-1980s, increasing by 1.6
percentage points on the Gini index.2
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Figure 9. Poverty rates in the advanced economies, mid-1990s to the late 2000s (60%ofmedian
income) Note: Arrows indicate the change and direction of income poverty.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD in OECD.Stat).
Poverty inAustralia has also increased since themid-1990s, by onepercentage
point. Over a fifth (22 per cent) of Australians now live with disposable household
income below the 60 per cent poverty threshold. As shown in Figure 9, this
puts Australia above most of the other advanced economies on this measure of
hardship. And while some of the latest evidence on social exclusion in Australia
points to a decline in levels of exclusion overall as a result of Labor’s policies,
nevertheless prospects for some of Australia’s most excluded citizens did not
improve over the 2007–13 period (Saunders, 2013). So, while the size of the group
in this position appears to have shrunk, its distance from the mainstream has
undoubtedly grown.
Progress on tackling Indigenouspeoples’ disadvantage remained slowdespite
a range of policy initiatives such as ‘Closing the Gap’, designed to create a more
inclusive Australia. The unemployment rate for people of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islanderorigin inAustralia, at 20per cent, is over three times thenational av-
erage. IndigenousAustralians tend to live in areas of socio-economicdisadvantage
and experience a gap in life expectancy at birth estimated to be 11.3 years formales
and9.5 years for females, compared to totalmales and females. Less thanone-third
of young IndigenousAustralians (agedbetween seventeenandeighteenyears) and
only abouthalf of youngpeople from lowsocio-economicbackgroundsobtain the
school leaving qualification (Whiteford, 2013). Youth unemployment continues
to be a concern and gender inequalities stubbornly persist in Australian society.
Australia is a longway fromgender pay parity – a keymeasure of fairness – despite
thepolicy of ‘equal pay for equalwork’. From 2010, workingparentswere given the
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right to request flexiblework arrangements andworking times. State policy clearly
matters but state-level provision is shaped in importantways at the organisational
level and within the workplace. Women are much more ‘flexible’ workers than
men. In Australia, 70 per cent of part-time employment is female (so in practice
Australia nowhasmainly one (male) and a half (female) ‘bread-winner’ families).
Part-time work and fixed-term contracts help to explain the inferior labour
market position of women, who are disproportionately responsible for care
work (Craig and Mullan, 2011). The re-engineering of welfare policy in the
name of social investment by the Labor government arguably struggled to
tackle some of the deeply entrenched gender, cultural and ethnic inequalities.
Drawing together the continuities and breaks in ‘social investment’ policy, as
implemented by the Australian Labor Party, we find improvements in living
standards for most Australians, but continued economic growth has not been
inclusive for all. Persistent poverty, multiple and entrenched social disadvantage
and growing social inequality continue to trouble Australian society (Leigh,
2013).
In the European context, social policy scholars warn that the shifting
emphasis of social policy towards social investment in human capital policies
and labour market integration may well come at the expense of social protection
and inclusion for all. Certainly there is growing evidence for this in Europe
(Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2013; Van Kersbergen andHemerijck, 2012), and this
must be the concern within the Australian context. Social security against the
adverse effects of the labour market is still of value to society and the citizens
who are protected by social policy. Thus, employment ‘flexibility’ and traditional
social protection, in the form of a secure safety net that provides workers with an
adequate standard of living in the event of unemployment is a precondition for
an effective ‘heavy’ social investment strategy that promotes equality and protects
against poverty in the event of unemployment.
Early on in its term, the Labor government appears to have acknowledged
that it faced heavy constraints and inevitable limits were placed on its strategy
of ‘social investment’. Thus, the government posed the relevant policy question:
‘Does Australia’s level of social expenditure underwrite the social investments
necessary for an inclusive society?’ The answer, it would seem, turns out to be
decisive:
Even after allowing for difficulties in harmonising different accounting systems, the conclusion is
inevitable that Australia stands near the bottom of the list of relative social expenditures (Australian
Government, 2009: 81, emphasis added).
Here Labor seems to have accepted that the necessary platform for social
investment in Australia was ‘light’ at best; essentially concluding that Australia’s
overall level of social expenditure was probably unlikely to be sufficient to
underwrite the level of ‘heavy’ social investment needed for a more inclusive
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 30 Apr 2015 IP address: 82.45.38.77
social investment after neoliberalism 315
society. Even after allowing for difficulties in harmonising international data,
as the government suggests, it is clear Australia’s social investment strategy
looks different frommany other comparable European countries in a number of
important respects. Investment in ALMPs remains low, as do social expenditure
levels more generally, although health and education have benefited from
additional investment. Out-of-work benefits, already low by international
standards, lost value against earnings. In this context, Labor’s legacy appears
to have been the recognition that greater investment was needed, but the
accompanying revenue-raising strategy was out of reach. Hence, the low tax
road towards ‘social investment’.
Conclusions
In many ways, the Australian experience reflects the general move away from
the neoliberal model of economy and society, that dominated the late twentieth
century, and thedesires ofAustralian social democrats,who returned to the ‘social
investment’ paradigm that seeks inclusive growth (this time for all Australians)
and once again regards social policy as economic investment.
In a number of important respects, however, the Australian approach (and
that of other liberal market economies) differs from the social investment
strategies being pursed in some European contexts (Morel et al., 2012). In the
liberal state of Australia, as we have shown, there has been a decisive move to
strengthen the social policy framework for ‘hardworking families’ – ‘the battlers’
against the ‘dole bludgers’ – as rhetorical incarnations of economic struggle (or
the ‘strivers’ verses the ‘skivers’ in the British context).3 In the battle over the
political middle ground, more affluent middle-class families have been brought
into the social security system. Dual-earner families on low-to-middle incomes
now receive ‘welfare-in-work’. Under Labor, social investment was orientated
towards meeting their needs and protecting their living standards – although
greater efforts are required to tackle gender inequalities in the labour market
and caring roles in the home. Nevertheless, the range of initiatives implemented
by Labor can be seen as forging a new de facto ‘contract’ whereby the state
has now absorbed greater responsibility for complementing the ‘market family
wage’, at least for working families. From this perspective, there has been a
complete transformation of the Australian welfare state; the dual-earner family-
centred mode of household welfare production is fast replacing the vacuum left
by the ‘male bread-winner’ model. Here we might also wish to draw attention
to the continued role of politics in the policy process, determining social policy
outcomes. The old ‘male breadwinner/female home-maker’ family model of
welfare grew out of the democratic class struggle and, in turn, it is a new politics
that has shaped, if not constrained, the path of ‘social investment’ in Australia
(Deeming, 2013b).
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Labor’s defining achievement has been to recreate a state of investment
for ‘working families’, and, in the social democratic tradition, one that has
benefited working families at the lower end of the income distribution, which
also protects their living standards in retirement, and all Australians in the event
of poor health and/or disability. In other ways, Labor’s ‘light’ approach to social
investment strengthened the policy of ‘workfarism’ it had inherited from the
Howard-led Liberal–National coalition government (1996–2007), taking a more
punitive stance towards social assistance recipients in an effort to move non-
working citizens off welfare benefits and into paid employment. A more fully
engaged ‘heavy’ social investment scenario that offers better insurance against
the risk of unemployment is costly and has never carried much appeal with the
Australian electorate. Under the Labor government, social protection lost ground
to rising living standards in the working population, and social inequality has in
many respects become more visible.
The article therefore exposes some of the tensions inherent in the pursuit of
‘social investment’ and inclusion strategies by leftist parties within the ‘neoliberal
state’ (Plant, 2012). Social democrats in Australia face particular challenges where
political institutions facilitate the pursuit of private ends, rather than defined
political goals like ‘social investment’ for a more just society. At the same time,
we also find the Nordic welfare states in the midst of transformation (Kananen,
2014). All eyes are now on the Nordic countries to see if ‘heavy investment’ which
has produced ‘high efficiency’ in the capitalistmarket economywith ‘high equity’
in the distribution of resources and life chances in society can be maintained in
the face of global forces andpressures from the new international economic order.
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Notes
1 The notion that unemployment benefits are ‘passive’ can be problematic. Out-of-work
benefits help to support livelihoods and aid workers in their search for new employment.
2 TheGini indexmeasures the extent towhich the income distribution deviates from a perfectly
equal distribution: 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality.
3 Regrettably, such misleading rhetoric being used by politicians seriously risks undermining
trust and social welfare services still further.
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